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ON RECOGNIZING VARIATIONS IN
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jerold H. Israel*
Everyone recognizes that the laws governing criminal proce-
dure vary somewhat from state to state.' There is often a ten-
dency, however, to underestimate the degree of diversity that
exists. Even some of the most experienced practitioners believe
that aside from variations on some minor matters, such as the
number of peremptory challenges granted, and variation on a
few major items, such as the use of the grand jury, the basic
legal standards governing most procedures are approximately
the same in a large majority of states.'
I have seen varied evidence of this misconception in practi-
tioner discussions of law reform proposals, particularly at the lo-
cal level. Too often, both prosecutors and defense counsel have
shown no hesitancy in almost automatically characterizing their
jurisdiction's rule as "the general rule," or more cautiously, as "a
common rule." At times, even local idiosyncrasies have been
characterized as national standards. When reference to the law
of other jurisdictions would be particularly helpful, no reference
has been made because the speaker apparently assumed that
* Alene and Allen F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.B.A., 1956,
Case Western Reserve University; L.L.B., 1959, Yale University. This Article is an ex-
pansion of remarks delivered before the Alaska Judicial Conference in August, 1981. I
am indebted to the innovativeness of the Alaska judiciary for renewing my interest in
the variations in state law, a subject I first began to explore as a co-reporter for the
Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure and as a participant on several Michigan Bar
projects relating to the revision of that state's procedural standards.
1. In focusing on variations in the laws regulating the criminal justice process I do
not mean to downplay the importance of also recognizing diversity in the "institutional"
elements of the process. Differences in size, jurisdiction, personnel, organizational struc-
ture, administrative style, and similar factors often have greater practical significance
than differences in legal standards. This is especially true when, as is so common in the
criminal justice process, applicable legal standards grant administrators considerable dis-
cretion at several critical points in the process. See, e.g., M. GOTrREDSON & D. GorrF-
REDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JusTicE: TowARD THE RATIONAL EXERCISE oF Dis-
CRETION passim (1980). Two jurisdictions with almost identical laws may have criminal
justice systems operating quite differently due to differences in these institutional fac-
tors. See, e.g., P. WIcE, BAI. AND ITS REFORM: A NATIONAL SURVEY 4-32 (1973).
2. Even some academicians share this notion of "uniform" state laws, particularly
when focusing excessively on Supreme Court rulings. See infra notes 63-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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nothing new would be gleaned from the laws of other jurisdic-
tions. State laws have been criticized for failing to consider ele-
ments that could be found in the laws of other jurisdictions, but
without reference to those other laws as examples of what could
be done. Reformers have urged the elimination of a particular
state procedure, but failed to cite other states which have suc-
cessfully eliminated that procedure. Even where the speakers
have been aware that their local law differs from the law fol-
lowed in numerous other states, assumptions as to uniformity
may have created confusion. Because substantial variation was
viewed as the exception rather than the general rule, the local
departure from the perceived norm may have been treated as an
occasional sport - though it could just as easily have been one
of a substantial body of departures from that norm.
One factor that apparently plays a large role in fostering an
assumption of basic similarity in state law is a widespread mis-
conception as to the unifying role of common sources that have
helped shape state law. This Article will briefly explore that mis-
conception, note the extent to which it understates the diversity
in the law, and consider some of the benefits that might be
gained through a more accurate recognition of that diversity.8
Obviously, not all those who underestimate the degree of state
law variation do so for the same reasons. The discussions I have
heard, however, suggest an underlying misconception as to the
influence of three common sources on state law. That miscon-
ception ordinarily rests on one or more of the following prem-
ises: (1) for those procedures regulated heavily by the federal
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court decisions set a
uniform standard, except for an occasional state rule that may
exceed that standard; (2) for those areas regulated commonly by
court rule or legislation, many state provisions are based upon a
common model, such as the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, and therefore have largely similar standards; (3) for still
other areas, common law standards govern, and those standards
are fairly uniform. All of these premises contain some truth, yet
each overstates the situation. Of the three, the first is the most
troublesome - perhaps because it is the most valid - and will
3. I recognize that many practitioners - particularly many readers of this journal,
which so often features new state legislation - fully recognize the degree of diversity
that exists in the law. I believe, however, that such awareness is the exception rather
than the general rule. My own experience suggests that Justice Holmes's prescription is
particularly apposite to this subject. "[A]t this time we need education in the obvious
more than investigation of the obscure." 0. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in CoLLcm
LEGAL PAPEws 291, 292-93 (1920).
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therefore be considered at greater length than the others.4
I. CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION AND UNIFORMITY IN STATE LAW
Although constitutional standards provide a uniform floor for
state law, individual states are free to go above that floor and
adopt standards exceeding constitutionally mandated mini-
mums. It is generally recognized that states often do this when
the constitutional minimum falls below traditional state com-
mon law requirements. For instance, the federal constitutional
minimum permits a non-unanimous jury verdict,' but attorneys
familiar with the process are unlikely to assume that many
states allow such verdicts. 6 The same is true of felony juries of
less than twelve persons, a practice mandated by only a handful
of states.7 Constitutional standards in these areas are correctly
assumed to have had an insignificant impact upon state law.
There is a quite different perception, however, as to areas of
criminal procedure in which constitutional standards often ex-
ceed traditional common law requirements, especially where the
constitutional regulation is fairly extensive. Many practitioners
assume that, in these areas, the constitutional minimum is al-
most always the controlling standard, and therefore there is ba-
sic uniformity in the law throughout the country. Here, it is
thought, the states, with only a few exceptions, have declined to
exercise their authority to go beyond the constitutional mini-
mums. Accordingly, it is assumed that the controlling search and
seizure standards are those set by Supreme Court decisions in-
terpreting the fourth amendment, that the standards for admis-
sibility of confessions are those prescribed by Miranda v. Ari-
4. This emphasis should not be taken as evidence of "constitutional myopia." Al-
though many academicians find the constitutional aspects of criminal procedure more
stimulating than the non-constitutional aspects, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying
text, my focus here stems from the tendency to give constitutional minimums greater
credit as a unifying factor in the law.
5. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (upholding a 10-2 verdict); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (upholding a 9-3 verdict). Non-unanimous verdicts for six
person juries are not, however, constitutionally acceptable. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441
U.S. 130 (1979).
6. As of 1976, only four states permitted non-unanimous verdicts and only two of
these, Louisiana and Oregon, permitted such verdicts in felony cases. See E. PREscoTr,
FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM 9 (1976).
7. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding the use of six-person juries
in non-capital felony cases). As of 1977, only five states mandated juries of less than 12
persons in felony cases. See J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 286-89 (1977).
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zona5  and its progeny, that the standards relating to a
defendant's right to counsel are those set by sixth amendment
precedent, and that the standards governing permissible retrials
are those set by the Supreme Court's double jeopardy rulings.
For many aspects of these subjects, the prevailing standard is
that set by Supreme Court decisions. The vast majority of the
states, however, have standards governing at least a few aspects
that exceed the constitutional minimum. Although these diver-
gent state standards are exceptions to the general dominance of
constitutional standards, the exceptions are by no means few or
limited to a small group of states. Indeed, the more rigorous
state standards sometimes constitute the majority position.
When appointing counsel to assist indigent misdemeanor defen-
dants, for example, a majority of the states have standards ex-
ceedings the Scott v. Illinois' ruling limiting mandatory ap-
pointment of counsel to cases in which the defendant receives a
jail sentence. 10
It would take more space and research assistance than I have
available to attempt even a modest review of the various state
standards exceeding the constitutional minimum. 1 The range of
these standards can be fairly well illustrated, however, by exam-
ining the standards even of a single state. I have selected Michi-
gan for this purpose because I am most familiar with Michigan
law. Admittedly, the Michigan courts have been somewhat more
"activist" than courts in many other states, but the Michigan
legislature has probably been less active than its counterparts in
other states. Even if Michigan has more standards exceeding the
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
10. Justice Brennan's dissent in Scott noted that "Scott would be entitled to ap-
pointed counsel under the current laws of at least 33 States." Id. at 388. Seven years
before Scott, at the time of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), it was only a
considerably smaller number of states that managed to provide counsel for all jail-sen-
tence cases. Most states apparently limited their appointments to the more serious mis-
demeanor offenses. See Israel, Criminal Procedure: The Burger Court, and the Legacy
of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1319, 1338 n.76 (1977). Once Argersinger re-
quired these states to adopt a broader standard, many of them did not limit their new
standard to the actual incarceration requirement, but included instead all cases in which
there was statutory potential for imprisonment. See, e.g., Scott, 440 U.S. at 386 n.18
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing cases and statutes). If the line were drawn at actual
incarceration, a magistrate would have to prejudge the likelihood of incarceration in the
individual case, and these states apparently preferred to avoid that difficulty.
11. The Harvard Law Review recently devoted ten pages simply to describing recent
state constitutional interpretations that exceeded federal standards in the areas of search
and seizure, self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and right to counsel. See Developments
in the Law - The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324,
1370-79 (1982).
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constitutional minimum than most other states, it is by no
means an extreme example.
A. Search and Seizure: Standing
In United States v. Salvucci, 12 the Supreme Court abandoned
the "automatic standing" rule of Jones v. United States."3 Jones
had granted defendants the automatic right to challenge the
seizure of property when they were charged with an offense that
included as an element their possession of that property.
Salvucci held that the mere possession of property did not nec-
essarily coincide with a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
property. Consequently, the person with possession would not be
assumed automatically to have a sufficient privacy interest to
challenge the property's seizure. In People v. Smith,14 the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals refused to follow Salvucci. It held instead
that Michigan would continue to adhere to the automatic stand-
ing rule in Jones, "as it provides greater protection to the citi-
zens of this state from unreasonable searches and seizures."
1 5
In Rakas v. Illinois,16 the Supreme Court discarded another
aspect of the Jones analysis of standing - the suggestion that
any defendant legitimately on the premises at the time of a
search would have standing to challenge that search. Rakas sub-
stituted an analysis focusing upon the defendant's reasonable
expectation of privacy in the particular area searched, arguably
cutting off standing to such persons as the casual visitor at the
scene of a search. In People v. Chernowas," the Michigan Court
of Appeals did not need to choose between the Jones and Rakas
formulations of standing, but did urge the Michigan Supreme
Court to retain the legitimate-presence standard of Jones when
the issue arose.1 8
12. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
13. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
14. No. 51035, 115 Mich. App. - (Mich. Ct. App. May 14, 1982).
15. Id. at ***. The Michigan court relied in part on the reasoning of State v. Alston,
88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981), another state court decision retaining automatic
standing. See also State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980).
16. 439 U.S. 128 (1978); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (reaffirm-
ing support for Rakas).
17. 111 Mich. App. 1, 314 N.W.2d 505 (1981).
18. See also People v. Nabers, 103 Mich. App. 354, 303 N.W.2d 205 (1981) (sug-
gesting that a defendant's legitimate presence on the premises provides standing to chal-
lenge the search), rev'd on other grounds, 411 Mich. 1046, 309 N.W.2d 187, amended,
41" Mich. ***, 313 N.W.2d 284 (1981).
SPRING 19821
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B. Search Warrants
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
search warrant affidavits may be based on information obtained
from informants, provided there are sufficient indicia of the in-
formation's reliability."9 The Michigan search warrant statute,
however, imposes a further limitation. To avoid reliability ques-
tions, it requires that warrant affidavits contain "affirmative al-
legations that the person [who supplied information to the com-
plainant] spoke with personal knowledge of the matters
contained therein. ' 20 This provision arguably bars reliance on
the hearsay of one informant repeating information received
from another informant - that is, an affidavit based on double
hearsay.21
Michigan statutory law also goes beyond the federal constitu-
tional standard governing the execution of search warrants.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a state may authorize an
unannounced entry into a building when notice of the officer's
intention to enter would likely result in destruction of the evi-
dence to be seized.2 In contrast, the Michigan statute on entry
to execute a search warrant limits entry without notice only to
those situations in which notice would create a physical danger
to the officer or another person. It does not include a destruc-
tion-of-evidence exception. 8
19. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
20. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 780.653 (1979).
21. See Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Pro-
posals, 73 MICH. L. REv. 221, 264-65 (1974) (noting Bar Committee recommendation to
eliminate this requirement as constitutionally unnecessary). This statutory requirement
is unlikely to apply when the first informant is another police officer. See People v.
Fuller, 106 Mich. App. 263, 307 N.W.2d 467 (1981) ("when one police officer receives
information from a fellow police officer, the law allows him to assume that his source is
credible. . . . [Tihe magistrate, too, may consider the source to be credible.").
22. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Although Ker involved unannounced
entry to make an arrest, it is generally viewed as authorizing unannounced entry to
search on the same grounds. See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzuRE § 4.8 (1978).
23. Michigan law provides for unannounced entry by an officer executing a warrant
"when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the war-
rant." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.656 (1979). This language is generally viewed as recogniz-
ing a danger-to-the-person exception, though the matter is far from settled. See Israel,
supra note 21, at 284. Courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes have recognized
a destruction-of-evidence exception as part of the common law. See, e.g., People v. Gas-
telo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967). The controversy surrounding
that exception, however, makes it highly questionable whether the Michigan courts
would act without legislative authorization. See, e.g., People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App.
288, 244 N.W.2d 451 (1976), discussed infra note 27. See generally Israel, supra note 21,
at 286-89. A Michigan Bar Committee recommended adoption of a destruction-of-evi-
dence exception when the unannounced entry was approved by the magistrate in issuing
[VOL. 15:3
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Supreme Court dictum in Davis v. Mississippi, 4 indicates
that full-fledged probable cause is not necessary to issue a war-
rant directing an officer to take a suspect into custody for the
limited purpose of obtaining identification evidence such as
fingerprints." Although such "identification orders" have been
issued in other jurisdictions, 6 the Michigan Court of Appeals
has held that, absent legislative authorization, Michigan courts
lack authority to issue identification orders on less than proba-
ble cause.2 '
C. Scope of Warrantless Searches
In Chambers v. Maroney,8 the United States Supreme Court
held that the moving vehicle exception to the warrant require-
ment extended to a warrantless search of an automobile made
after the driver's arrest and the automobile's seizure. Although
not expressing disagreement with the Chambers ruling, the
Michigan Court of Appeals has taken a very narrow view of the
the warrant, id. at 286, but no legislative action was taken on this proposal.
24. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
25. The Court in Davis noted that it was "arguable... that, because of the unique
nature of the fingerprinting process,... detentions [for the limited purpose of obtaining
prints] might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the
Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense." Id.
at 727. Further support for the constitutionality of such orders may be found in United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). See generally Usw. R. CrM. Proc. 436 comment
(1974); Note, Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause, 72
COLUM. L. Rav. 712 (1972).
26. See, e.g., Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205 (D.C. 1971) (lineup orders); In re Finger-
printing of M.B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973). See generally Israel, supra note
21, at 238-41 (noting statutory provisions authorizing identification orders on less than
probable cause).
27. See People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288, 244 N.W.2d 451 (1976). Marshall
involved an order to obtain blood type and hair samples. Because the taking of blood
involves a substantially greater personal intrusion than fringerprinting, the Davis dictum
suggesting a less-than-probable-cause standard, 394 U.S. at 727, would arguably not ap-
ply. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The taking of the hair sample, on
the other hand, belongs arguably to the same category as the fingerprinting considered in
Davis. See UNw. R. CaM. PRoc. 436 comment (1974). But cf. In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Mills), 522 F. Supp. 500, 502 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that hair samples are "more
comparable to blood samples" than to voice exemplars or the measurement of defen-
dant's height and weight). The Marshall opinion acknowledged the possible distinction
between taking fingerprints and taking blood samples, but chose to bar any type of iden-
tification order based on less than probable cause "in the absence of legislation or rule
promulgated by the Supreme Court." 69 Mich. at 299, 244 N.W.2d at 457. Treating the
order before it as a search warrant, the Marshall court went on to find the order sup-
ported by probable cause and therefore valid.
28. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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Chambers expansion of the moving vehicle exception.29 Thus,
the search of the trunk of an automobile - as opposed to its
interior - has been held not to fall within the moving vehicle
exception where the occupants were in custody and the "vehicle
was entirely under the control of the authorities."30
D. Electronic Eavesdropping
Although Katz v. United States 1 held that non-consensual
electronic eavesdropping was a search under the fourth amend-
ment, the Court there also made clear that limited electronic
eavesdropping, authorized by a warrant, could meet fourth
amendment standards. In response, Congress adopted Title III
29. See infra note 30.
30. People v. Gaskill, 107 Mich. App. 304, 315, 309 N.W.2d 250 (1981). The search in
Gaskill occurred after the defendants were arrested for possession of marijuana following
a traffic stop. The court noted that, while stopping the vehicle and subsequently search-
ing the interior "may have been reasonable under the circumstances," id., opening the
trunk and searching it and the articles found there was not:
The vehicle was entirely under the control of the authorities after the three sub-
jects exited from the vehicle and were placed in the police cruiser. A wrecker
service was summoned to tow the vehicle to the appropriate impoundment lot,
and the police could have, and indeed did, secure a search warrant which was
executed in less than 24 hours from the time of the stop.
Whether the Court of Appeals will continue to adhere to Gaskill is questionable in
light of Michigan v. Thomas, 102 S. Ct. 3079 (1982)(per curiam), rev'g People v. Thomas,
106 Mich. App. 601, 308 N.W.2d 170 (1981). People v. Thomas, relying on a restrictive
view of Chambers, held that the search of an air vent did not fall within the moving
vehicle exception when the car had been impounded prior to the search. In reversing
that ruling, the Supreme Court of the United States stressed that where a car is stopped
on the road and the police have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside, the
justification for a warrantless search "does not vanish once the car has been immobi-
lized." Id. at 3081.
While it is obvious that the Michigan Court of Appeals - and perhaps the Michigan
Supreme Court, see People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 320 N.W.2d 866 (1982) (rejecting a
protective search justification for a car search) - would prefer a narrower compass for
warrantless automobile searches than that suggested by United States Supreme Court
precedent, that result is not readily reached under state law. Most of the car search cases
have involved the seizure of narcotics or firearms, and the Michigan Constitution's provi-
sion on searches prohibits excluding from evidence "any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb,
explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage
of any dwelling house." MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 11. This has led the Michigan Supreme
Court to rule that it cannot construe "the Michigan search and seizure clause [as] impos-
ing a higher standard of reasonableness for searches and seizures of items named in the
proviso than the United States Supreme Court has held applicable under the Fourth
Amendment." People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N.W.2d 770, 775 (1974) (foot-
notes omitted). But cf. People v. Cavitt, 86 Mich. App. 59, 272 N.W.2d 196 (1978) (seem-
ingly ignoring United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), in holding that an officer,
after frisking a person arrested on a traffic offense, could not withdraw a pill container
from his person without a reasonable basis for believing it contained a weapon).
31. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,.
authorizing non-consensual electronic eavesdropping under stan-
dards designed to meet the fourth amendment requirements
noted in Katz and Burger v. New York. 8' Because Title III pre-
empted the field, the failure of a state to adopt legislation fol-
lowing the Title III standards leaves its courts without authority
to authorize non-consensual electronic eavesdropping." Michi-
gan and approximately half the states have refused to adopt the
necessary enabling legislation. 8
In United States v. White," the Supreme Court held that
electronic eavesdropping conducted with the prior consent of
one of the parties to the recorded or monitored conversation did
not fall within the fourth amendment. Relying in large part on
the analysis of Justice Harlan's dissent in White, the Michigan
courts have held that such consensual electronic eavesdropping
does constitute a search under the Michigan Constitution, and
therefore is permissible only when authorized by a valid search
warrant."'
E. Police Interrogation
In People v. Reed,8 the Michigan Supreme Court stated that
Miranda warnings must be given prior to the interrogation of
32. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1977 & Supp. IV 1981).
33. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding a New York eavesdropping statute unconstitutional).
34. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2516 (1977 & Supp. IV 1981).
35. See M. HINDELANG, M. GoTFREDSON & T. FLANAGAN, 1980 SouRcmoK op Cmui-
NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 395 (1981) (listing 25 states that had adopted enabling legislation
as of 1979). Enabling legislation has been introduced in the Michigan legislature on sev-
eral occasions but has never advanced very far. See, eg., H.B. 554 & H.B. 5546, 78th
Leg., 1st Sess. (1975).
36. 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality).
37. See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975); People v. Taylor,
93 Mich. App. 292, 287 N.W.2d 210 (1979); People v. Hall, 88 Mich. App. 324, 276
N.W.2d 897 (1979). Justice Harlan's dissent in White drew a distinction between third-
party monitoring, where a participant uses an electronic device that transmits the con-
versation to a third party, and participant recording, where the participant records
secretly the conversation for subsequent divulgence to a third party. 401 U.S. at 792
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Earlier cases had held that participant recording did not consti-
tute a search, see, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), and Justice Harlan
argued against the extension of those rulings to third-party monitoring. Although the
Beavers opinion relied on Justice Harlan's analysis and the Beavers ruling was clearly
limited to third-party monitoring, 393 Mich. at 562-63 n.2, 227 N.W.2d at 514 n.2, the
decisions in Hall and Taylor extended the Beavers rationale to participant recordings as
well. See also People v. Atkins, 96 Mich. App. 672, 293 N.W.2d 671 (1980) (requiring
prior judicial authorization for two-way recording by third party).
38. 393 Mich. 342, 357-60, 224 N.W.2d 867, 874 (1975).
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any suspect upon whom "the investigation had focused."' 9
Under this "focus" standard, warnings could be required even
though the suspect had not been taken into custody. The United
States Supreme Court's subsequent opinions in Beckwith v.
United States40 and Oregon v. Mathiason,4' emphasized that
custody, not focus, triggers the Miranda warnings. Nevertheless,
in People v. Brannan,4s without mentioning Beckwith or
Mathiason, the Michigan Supreme Court continued to refer to a
focus standard.4 3 The Court of Appeals panels subsequently
split on the continuing vitality of the focus test, some finding
that it was retained, apparently as a matter of Michigan, not
federal, constitutional law.4
F. Entrapment
In United States v. Russell,45 the Supreme Court rejected the
defendant's contention that due process should "preclude any
prosecution when it is shown that the criminal conduct would
not have been possible had not an undercover agent 'supplied an
indispensible means to the commission of the crime.'"" The
39. Id. at 360.
40. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
41. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
42. 406 Mich. 104, 276 N.W.2d 14 (1979).
43. Id. at 118-20, 276 N.W.2d at 22. The reference was confusing, however, because
the court also talked in terms of custody, apparently equating focus with custody. The
Brannan opinion followed a three-step analysis, reasoning that: (1) the concept of cus-
tody under Miranda applied to those "'taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
[their] freedom of action in a significant way,' " id. at 127 n.3, 276 N.W.2d at 22 n.3
(emphasis added) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)); (2) the Mi-
randa Court, in explaining Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), indicated that the
focus test was related to this concept of "custody," 384 U.S. at 444 n.4; therefore, (3) a
suspect should be assumed automatically to be in "custody" - i.e., deprived of his free-
dom in a significant way - when he is being questioned by a police officer and the
investigation has obviously focused upon him. The lower court ruling affirmed in Bran-
nan excluded five statements obtained through jailhouse interrogation. The court did
not, however, exclude an earlier statement, finding that the defendant "was not in cus-
tody" at the time "of the interview." The setting of that "interview" was not discussed.
See People v. Brannan, 64 Mich. App. 374, 236 N.W.2d 80 (1975), aff'd, 406 Mich. 104
(1979).
44. Compare People v. Chernowas, 111 Mich. App. 1, 314 N.W.2d 505 (1981) (apply-
ing Miranda to questioning following a traffic stop, where the investigation had focused
because the officer detected a strong odor believed to be marijuana), and People v. Wal-
lach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981) (focus test still applies), with People v.
Martin, 78 Mich. App. 518, 260 N.W.2d 869 (1977) (Beckwith and Mathiason override
focus test, because that test was based on an interpretation of Miranda), and People v.
Schram, 98 Mich. App. 292, 296 N.W.2d 840 (1980) (same).
45. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
46. Id. at 431 (quoting Brief for Respondent, at 20-21).
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Court adhered to the "subjective" test for entrapment, looking
not at police conduct, but at the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime. 47 In dissent, Justice Stewart urged adoption
of the "objective test" for entrapment pursuant to the Court's
supervisory power over the administration of justice in federal
courts. 8 In People v. Turner,4e the Michigan Supreme Court,
persuaded by Justice Stewart's reasoning, adopted as a matter of
state law the objective test for entrapment."0
G. Identification Procedures
In Kirby v. Illinois,1 the United States Supreme Court held
that an arrested person subjected to a "show-up" or "lineup"
has a sixth amendment right to counsel" only if adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings have already been initiated. Before
then, the arrestee is not an "accused" in a "criminal prosecu-
tion" so the sixth amendment does not attach." In United
States v. Ash,"' the Supreme Court held that even a person
against whoin adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated
is not entitled to representation at a photo-identification proce-
dure because it is not a "critical stage" in the criminal prosecu-
tion. 5 In People v. Jackson," the Michigan Supreme Court
went beyond both Kirby and Ash. The Jackson opinion, reaf-
firming the pre-Ash decision in People v. Anderson,5 held that:
(1) "[s]ubject to certain exceptions, identification by photograph
should not be used where the accused is in custody;" and (2)
"[w]here there is a legitimate reason to use photographs for
47. Id. at 433. The Court did acknowledge, however, that it might someday be
presented with a situation "so outrageous" that due process would bar prosecution re-
gardless of the defendant's predisposition. Id. at 431-32.
48. Id. at 441-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The objective test, advanced in concurring
opinions in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), and Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932), focuses on whether the methods employed by government agents,
viewed "objectively" (without regard to the particular defendant's predisposition),
should be condemned because they created too great a risk that even a normally law-
abiding citizen might be induced to commit a crime.
49. 390 Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973).
50. Id. at 22; see also People v. Alford, 405 Mich. 570, 275 N.W.2d 484 (1979).
51. 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
53. 406 U.S. at 690.
54. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
55. Id. at 313-17, 321.
56. 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974).
57. 389 Mich. 155. 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973).
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identification of an in-custody accused, he has the right to coun-
sel as much as he would for corporeal identification proce-
dures.""' By equating photo-identifications with lineups for the
purpose of the right to counsel, Jackson clearly rejects Ash. The
rejection of Kirby is not as clear because Jackson refers simply
to Anderson's holding on the rights of an "in-custody ac-
cused."" Read in light of Anderson, however, which sharply
criticized the Kirby dividing line, it is apparent that the Jackson
court intended to encompass all arrestees within its reference to
an "in-custody accused.""0
H. Joint Representation by Counsel
Under Holloway v. Arkansas 1 and Cuyler v. Sullivan,'" a trial
judge has a constitutional duty, under limited circumstances, to
inquire into a possible conflict of interest when codefendants are
jointly represented by the same counsel. Although the decisions
leave unanswered the exact circumstances triggering that duty,
Cuyler makes it clear that the judge has no duty to inquire in
every case of multiple representation." Michigan court rules, on
the other hand, require this automatic inquiry in all joint repre-
sentation cases." Moreover, joint representation is allowed only
on three conditions: (1) the lawyer involved must state on the
record that joint representation "will in all probability not cause
a conflict of interest" and must also state the reasons for this
conclusion; (2) the defendants must state that it is their desire
to proceed with the same lawyer; and (3) the trial court must
find that joint representation "will in all probability not cause a
58. Jackson, 391 Mich. at 337-38, 217 N.W.2d at 27.
59. Id. (quoting Anderson, 389 Mich. at 187). See Developments in the Law, supra
note 11, at 1378 n.75 (treating the Jackson rejection of Kirby as dictum).
60. The Anderson decision treated Kirby as a decision without precedential value
because there was only a plurality opinion adopting the dividing line of adversary judi-
cial proceedings. Nevertheless, the Anderson court clearly expressed its disapproval of
the Kirby dividing line, noting that it had not been followed in the Michigan decisions
applying pre-Kirby Supreme Court precedent. See Anderson, 389 Mich. at 170-71, 205
N.W.2d at 467-68. Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court's statement of the facts in
Jackson suggests that the defendant there had not been the subject of adversary judicial
proceedings at the time of the photo-identification; the identification occurred when he
was in custody on another offense and not yet under arrest for the crime being investi-
gated. See Jackson, 391 Mich. at 330-31, 217 N.W.2d at 23 (opinion of the court), id. at
348-49, 217 N.W.2d at 32 (Coleman, C.J., dissenting).
61. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
62. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
63. Id. at 346-48.
64. MIcH. GEN. CT. R. 785.4(4).
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conflict of interest," and must give reasons for its finding."
. Immunity
In Kastigar v. United States," the Supreme Court held that
the government could constitutionally supplant an individual's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by granting
him immunity against the "use and derivative use" of compelled
testimony.67 It had previously been assumed that broader trans-
actional immunity was constitutionally required and many state
immunity statutes at that time granted such transactional im-
munity." Although some jurisdictions followed the federal ex-
ample, 9 and adopted use and derivative use immunity,70 Michi-
gan retained transactional immunity."' Indeed, the applicable
Michigan statute guarantees the immunized grand jury witness
the right to have counsel present during testimony,2 protection
that again exceeds the constitutional minimum. 3
J. Defendant's Silence
A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have found
no constitutional violation in prosecutorial use of a defendant's
65. Id. 785.4(4)(a)-(c).
66. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
67. Id. at 462; see also Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406
U.S. 472 (1972) (upholding state statute on use/derivative use of testimony).
68. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 767.19a-.19c (1970).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970).
70. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1715 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44 (Page
1978).
71. See MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 767.19a-.19c (1970); People v. Patterson, 58 Mich. App.
727, 228 N.W.2d 804 (1975). A special committee of the Michigan State Bar recom-
mended the adoption of legislation giving the prosecutor the option of choosing between
transactional and use/derivative use immunity, but no legislative action was taken on
that proposal. See SPECIAL COMMIrEE FOR THE REVISION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN, PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE MICHIGAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PRO-
CEDURE: PROPOSED CHAPTERS SIX AND SEVEN 247-52 (1977).
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.19e (1979).
73. Although there is no Supreme Court ruling directly on point, the Court has stated
in dictum that witnesses do not have a constitutional right to the presence of counsel
when they testify, see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957), and federal practice tradi-
tionally has not permitted counsel's presence, see Fa. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) (limiting persons
who may be present to the witness, the stenographer, and the government attorney). See
also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion) (support-
ing Groban dictum); cf. id. at 603-05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting Groban dictum,
yet supporting the right to counsel only for a putative defendant-witness; even there, not
necessarily counsel located in the grand jury room).
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pre-arrest or post-arrest silence (other than that following Mi-
randa warnings) for impeachment purposes at trial.74 In con-
trast, Michigan does not permit impeachment use - or any
other use - of either pre-arrest or post-arrest silence, except
where used to contradict the assertion that defendant actually
made a statement.78 In Lakeside v. Oregons the Supreme Court
held that the defendant's fifth amendment right to refuse to
take the stand was not unconstitutionally burdened by a trial
court's insistence upon giving a "protective instruction" advising
the jury that no adverse conclusion could be drawn from defen-
dant's failure to testify, notwithstanding defendant's preference
that the instruction not be given. Under Michigan law, the de-
fendant has the option of preventing that instruction.7
K. Speedy Trial
Under the four-pronged balancing test of Barker v. Wingo7 8
the period of pretrial delay, including incarceration pending
trial, may be quite substantial without violating a defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial. 9 While Michigan does not
go as far as states which restrict pretrial delay to a limited time
period,80 it does restrict the permissible period of pretrial incar-
ceration.81 In their treatment of precharge delay, Michigan
74. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (pre-arrest silence); Fletcher v.
Weir, 102 S. Ct. 1309 (1982) (post-arrest silence without Miranda warnings); cf. Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings).
75. People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d 190 (1973); People v. Hurd, 102 Mich.
App. 424, 301 N.W.2d 881 (1980), cert. granted pending lower court determination of
state or federal constitutional grounds, 102 S. Ct. 81 (1981); People v. Wade, 93 Mich.
App. 735, 287 N.W.2d 368 (1979).
76. 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
77. People v. Hampton, 394 Mich. 437, 231 N.W.2d 654 (1975) (also noting, however,
that in a joint trial the instruction must be given if any one defendant requests it).
78. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
79. Barker listed four factors to be considered on a case-by-case basis: (1) length of
delay; (2) the government's justification for the delay; (3) whether and how the defen-
dant assert his rights; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay. Id. at 530-33. In Barker, a
delay of over five years, including incarceration for 10 months, was held not to violate
the defendant's sixth amendment right.
80. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PRocEnuDR: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1111 (5th ed. 1980).
81. See MICH. GEN. CT. R. 789.1 (requiring defendants' release on their own recogni-
zance after incarceration of six months in felony cases or 30 days in misdemeanor cases).
The rule excludes from this tabulation, however, delays resulting from: (1) other judicial
proceedings; (2) continuances granted on defendant's personal request (after being ad-
vised of speedy trial rights); (3) continuances granted to the prosecutor on special justifi-
cation; (4) joint trial complications where there is good cause for not granting a sever-
ance; and (5) other periods of delay for good cause, but not including delay caused by
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courts adhere to the United States Supreme Court ruling in
United States v. Lovasco 2 that due process is violated only
upon a showing of both unjustified delay and actual prejudice.8 "
Michigan decisions arguably go beyond Lovasco, however, in
placing a lighter burden on the defendant for that showing. 4
L. Double Jeopardy
In Bartkus v. Illinois,85 the United States Supreme Court held
that a state was not barred from bringing state charges against a
person for essentially the same act - a bank robbery - that
had served as the basis for a previous federal prosecution." In
People v. Cooper,87 a similar case of dual bank robbery prosecu-
tions, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the double jeop-
docket congestion. Id. at 789.1(1)-(5).
In addition, when a defendant is imprisoned on one charge and demands a speedy trial
on pending charges, the pending case must ordinarily be brought to trial within 180 days
or be dismissed with prejudice. See MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 780.131-.133 (1979); see also
People v. Hill, 402 Mich. 272, 262 N.W.2d 641 (1978); People v. Moore, 96 Mich. App.
754, 293 N.W.2d 700 (1980); cf. People v. Forrest, 72 Mich. App. 266, 249 N.W.2d 384
(1976) (recognizing a limited good-faith exception that can carry the period beyond 180
days).
82. 431 U.S. 783 (1977).
83. Id. at 790; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
84. People v. Bisard, 114 Mich. App. 784, 310 N.W.2d 670 (1982) (holding that, once
defendant shows "some prejudice," the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show justifica-
tion). The Bisard court viewed this position - based on pre-Lavasco Michigan rulings
- as the preferable interpretation of Lovasco, while acknowledging that other jurisdic-
tions read Lavasco as placing a much heavier burden on the defendant. Consider also
People v. Parshay, 104 Mich. App. 411, 304 N.W.2d 593 (1981), noting that while a lack
of prejudice precluded a due process violation, the previously incarcerated defendant
would be given credit for incarceration during the period of an unjustified precharge
delay.
85. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
86. Id. at 127-39 (allowing state prosecution after the defendant was acquitted on the
federal charge). While Bartkus was decided prior to the incorporation of the federal
double jeopardy prohibition as a standard applicable to the states under the fourteenth
amendment, the current validity of the Bartkus ruling is unquestioned. The companion
case to Bartkus, Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (upholding a federal prose-
cution that followed a state prosecution), involved an application of the double jeopardy
clause; and the Court there utilized the same dual sovereignty analysis that was the
foundation for the Barthus ruling. Moreover, in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978) (decided after the fourteenth amendment incorporation of the double jeopardy
bar), the Court relied heavily on Bartkus in applying the dual sovereignty rationale in
the context of successive federal and Indian tribal prosecutions. Wheeler has been
viewed as putting to rest any suggestion that Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S.
52 (1964) (rejecting a separate-sovereignty limitation on the self-incrimination privilege),
undermined Bartkus and Abbate. See, e.g., State v. Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153
(1979); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (assuming continuing valid-
ity of Abbate).
87. 398 Mich. 450, 247 N.W.2d 866 (1976).
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ardy clause of the Michigan Constitution barred the state's suc-
cessive prosecution."8
In People v. White,8s the Michigan Supreme Court has given a
broader reading to the Michigan double jeopardy clause than
the United States Supreme Court has given to the fifth amend-
ment's double jeopardy clause. In a series of concurring and dis-
senting opinions, Justice Brennan has urged the United States
Supreme Court to adopt the view that the federal double jeop-
ardy clause bars multiple trials for separate offenses arising out
of the same transaction.'" The Supreme Court has continued to
read the clause, however, in light of the traditional "Blockburger
test,"91 focusing not on whether the offenses arose out of the
same transaction, but on whether each of the offenses requires
proof of additional facts.92 In White, the Michigan Supreme
Court discarded the Blockburger test in favor of Justice Bren-
nan's "same transaction" test.98
88. Id. at 461, 247 N.W.2d at 870 ("(The Michigan constitution] prohibits a second
prosecution for an offense arising out of the same criminal act unless it appears from the
record that the interests of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction which initially
prosecuted are substantially different."); cf. People v. Formicola, 407 Mich. 293, 294
N.W.2d 334 (1979) (applying exception noted in Cooper based on differences in maxi-
mum penalties and in substantive - as opposed to jurisdictional - elements of the
federal and state offenses).
89. 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W.2d 222 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 439 U.S. 970, 972 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 429 U.S. 1053, 1054 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436, 453 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
91. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
92. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 416 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161
(1977).
93. 390 Mich. at 258, 212 N.W.2d at 227. At the time White was decided, some
thought that Justice Brennan's view might prevail in the United States Supreme Court;
the White opinion thus relied upon both federal and state constitutional arguments. See
id. After the Supreme Court majority made clear its continued adherence to Block-
burger, see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), Michigan nevertheless continued to ap-
ply White's same-transaction test, see, e.g., People v. Sullivan, 407 Mich. 303, 284
N.W.2d 337 (1979).
Michigan law is also more protective of defendant's rights than federal double jeop-
ardy decisions with respect to prosecutorial appeals once jeopardy has attached. Al-
though United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), would apparently permit a prosecu-
tion appeal from a trial judge's entry of a judgment of acquittal following the return of a
jury verdict of guilty, see, e.g., United States v. Blasco, 581 F.2d 681 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978), the applicable Michigan statute does not authorize such an
appeal, see MICH. Comp. LAWS § 770.12; People v. Coolce, 113 Mich. App. 272, 275, 317
N.W.2d 594, 595 (1982). The Michigan statute permits an appeal from a post-jeopardy
dismissal of an indictment only where the dismissal is "based upon the invalidity or
construction of the statute upon which such indictment is founded." This provision also
would apparently not authorize the appeal upheld in United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978) (appeal from post-jeopardy dismissal based on prejudicial precharge delay).
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M. Prosecutorial and Judicial Vindictiveness
In North Carolina v. Pearce" and Blackledge v. Perry,95 the
United States Supreme Court adopted prophylactic due process
standards designed to preclude prosecutorial or judicial vindic-
tiveness against defendants who exercise their right of appeal
under state law. Pearce held that where a defendant successfully
appealed a conviction, was retried, and again convicted, the sen-
tence imposed upon the second conviction could not exceed the
original sentence unless the higher sentence was justified by ref-
erence to "objective information concerning identifiable conduct
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the orig-
inal sentence proceeding." 96 Blackledge held that, where the de-
fendant moved his case from a magistrate court to a court of
general jurisdiction by exercising his right to a trial de novo on a
misdemeanor appeal, the prosecutor could not respond by insti-
tuting a higher charge in the latter court.97 Neither Pearce nor
Blackledge applies when the defendant is charged with an of-
fense, pleads guilty to a lesser offense, and successfully chal-
lenges that lesser plea. In such a case the prosecutor can appar-
ently reinstitute the original charge and, if the defendant is
convicted on retrial, the judge can impose a higher sentence
commensurate with the higher charge.98
In People v. McMiller," however, the Michigan Supreme
Court expressed concern that permitting the prosecutor to re-
turn to the higher charge would "discourage exercise of the de-
fendant's right to appeal a conviction claimed to be based on an
improperly accepted plea, and [thereby] . . . tend to insulate
from appellate scrutiny non-compliance with [Michigan's] guilty
plea procedure."100 The court therefore prohibited the state
from charging a higher offense after a successful challenge to a
guilty plea, thereby limiting retrial to the charge for which the
previously accepted plea was offered. 0 1 This decision ordinarily
94. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
95. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
96. 395 U.S. at 726.
97. 417 U.S. at 28-29.
98. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914 (1971); see also Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal from a
Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 663, 701-02 (1974).
99. 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
100. Id. at 432, 208 N.W.2d at 453.
101. Id. at 434, 208 N.W.2d at 454; accord People v. Thornton, 403 Mich. 389, 269
N.W.2d 192 (1978). The McMiller rule does not apply where the prosecutor calls the
plea-taking error to the attention of the trial judge, but the judge nevertheless accepts
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would bar a higher sentence as well.1 02
Although not exhaustive, the above review of Michigan's de-
partures from minimum federal constitutional standards should
indicate the broad range of significant issues on which states
may exceed federal constitutional standards, even in areas of
substantial consitutional regulation. Moreover, contrary to what
might be suggested by recent commentary, state adoption of
more rigorous standards is not a new development, either in
Michigan or elsewhere.108 Although state courts are undoubtedly
the plea. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 135-36, 235 N.W.2d 132, 148 (1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1108 (1977).
102. Because Michigan's indeterminate sentencing procedure adopts automatically
the statutory maximum, a defendant benefited by McMiller could not receive a higher
maximum term. See MICH. Comp. LAWS § 769.8 (1979). A higher minimum is possible (so
long as the original minimum was less than two-thirds of the statutory maximum, see,
e.g., People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972)), but to accord with Pearce
that minimum must be justified by reference to defendant's conduct after the original
sentencing proceeding. See People v. Payne, 386 Mich. 84, 191 N.W.2d 375 (1971) (ap-
plying Pearce to reconvictions on the same charge following a successful challenge to a
guilty plea), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 47 (1973). Moreover, at least under Michi-
gan law, a defendant's shift from a position of admitted guilt to one of insisting upon
trial would not constitute post-sentencing conduct justifying a higher sentence. See id.;
People v. Grable, 57 Mich. App. 184, 225 N.W.2d 724 (1974); see also People v. Bottany,
43 Mich. App. 375, 204 N.W.2d 230 (1972) (dictum).
103. Law review commentators have recently given considerable attention to what
they have described as the "new federalism" movement among state courts, noting an
"emerging trend" of state court reliance upon state constitutional provisions to impose
safeguards that the current Supreme Court refuses to impose under the federal constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion
of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). See generally Developments in the Law,
supra note 11, at 1369 n.8 (citing a variety of articles on the subject). This trend is
usually attributed to the "retreat" of the Burger Court from the "Warren Court's philo-
sophical commitment to protection of the criminal suspect." Wilkes, More on the New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873, 873 (1975). Persuaded by Supreme
Court dissenting opinions arguably closer to the Warren Court philosophy, state courts
have apparently moved from federal constitutional grounds to state constitutional
grounds and adopted positions urged in those dissents. The dissenting justices have
sometimes suggested that the state courts do exactly that. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy,
102 S. Ct. 2083, 2089 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 451
n.12 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
This "rediscovery" of state constitutions is attracting considerable notice and is more
likely than any other factor to increase awareness of state departures from federal consti-
tutional standards. At least one major conference was held on the subject and separate
law school courses devoted to state constitutional law are being promoted. See
Margolick, State Judiciaries Are Shaping Law That Goes Beyond Supreme Court, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The "new federalism movement" has also been high-
lighted in criminal procedure casebooks. See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 80, at 47-50. This combination of events should increase substantially aware-
ness of state departures.
Unfortunately, the commentary on the "new federalism" does not always make clear
either that these "innovative" state constitutional rulings are a continuation of a well-
established practice, or that they represent the most visible portion of the myriad state
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turning more frequently to state constitutional guarantees as a
separate source of protection for individual liberties, they are
hardly "rediscovering" a source that had been ignored for "de-
cades" or "generations."'1 " Before federal constitutional deci-
sions worked a significant change in the state criminal justice
process, state constitutional guarantees were a major source of
definition of individual rights. Moreover, state courts often in-
terpreted these guarantees as imposing more rigorous limitations
uponr the state process than similar federal constitutional guar-
antees imposed upon the federal process.10 5 As the United States
Supreme Court moved toward a more expansive interpretation
of federal constitutional guarantees, and those federal guaran-
tees were more frequently made applicable to the states, reliance
on state constitutional provisions decreased. State courts hardly
forgot, however, their authority to construe more broadly their
state constitutions. Many state constitutional rulings in the
1950's and even in the 1960's - at the height of the Warren
Court's "criminal procedure revolution" - far exceeded posi-
tions taken by the United States Supreme Court.'06
legal standards which exceed federal constitutional minimums.
104. Cf. Margolick, supra note 103, at B8, col. 1 (recent Supreme Court rulings "have
created both a responsibility and an opportunity for state judges to scrutinize state con-
stitutional provisions for the first time in decades or perhaps in generations") (quoting
ACLU President Norman Dorsen).
105. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 479-80 (1940) (Black, J., dissenting) (not-
ing several state constitutional rulings requiring appointment of counsel for indigent de-
fendants in all felony cases before the Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion under
the sixth amendment in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); Little v. State, 171
Miss. 818, 159 So. 103 (1935) (refusing to follow the silver platter doctrine of federal
cases long before Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), rejected that doctrine);
Note, An Epilogue to Cichos: Double Jeopardy Examined, Am. U.L. REv. 500 (1968)
(noting a substantial body of state double jeopardy decisions adopting an implied acquit-
tal analysis, contrary to Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905), long before the
Supreme Court rejected Trono in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)).
106. See, e.g., Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1966) (though Supreme Court had not yet announced scope of sixth amendment in mis-
demeanor cases, state constitution required appointment of counsel for indigents
charged with traffic offense carrying maximum punishment of $50 fine or five days in
jail); Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961)
(California double jeopardy clause would not be construed within the boundaries of Gori
v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); retrial would not be allowed simply because the
trial judge, declaring a mistrial on his own initiative, had acted to benefit the defendant);
People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955) (allowing non-victim defendant
standing to challenge an unconstitutional search, a position rejected consistently by the
Supreme Court, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)); People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317,
118 N.E.2d 277 (1954) (applying fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine to exclude testi-
mony of a witness whose identity was discovered through an illegal entry, a position that
went far beyond federal precedent at the time and possibly beyond current federal law,
cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)); Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 93
N.W.2d 281 (1958) (taking a blood sample from an unconscious driver constituted an
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Moreover, notwithstanding increased reliance upon state con-
stitutional provisions, the majority of state court standards ex-
ceeding federal constitutional minimums are probably based not
on state constitutional provisions but on other sources of state
law. As with state constitutional interpretations, there is a well
established tradition of more rigorous state standards based on
court rules and statutes. In those areas where a substantial num-
ber of states go beyond constitutional minimums, the more rig-
orous state standards are based most frequently on legislation.
1 07
II. THE COMMON MODEL AND UNIFORMITY IN STATE LAW
Variations in state legal standards are more widely recognized
in those areas of state criminal procedure not subject to substan-
tial constitutional regulation; nevertheless, the historical diver-
sity in this area of state law also tends to be underestimated.
This stems largely from overestimating the influence of common
models as a unifying factor in shaping state law. For those judi-
cial procedures governed ordinarily by court rule or statute, for
instance, the most frequently cited common model is the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Federal Rules"). Prominent
federal legislative reforms, such as the Bail Reform Act of
unreasonable search under the Michigan constitution, regardless of whether probable
cause for the search existed at the time; such evidence is thus excluded from a civil tort
action, just as in a criminal case); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (once an attorney enters the proceedings, though adversary judicial
proceedings have not yet commenced, the Miranda warnings are insufficient; the police
may not question the arrestee unless counsel is present or a valid waiver is made in
counsel's presence); accord People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
107. Illustrative are the state laws barring a subsequent state prosecution based on
the same act as a previous federal prosecution, see supra notes 85-93 and accompanying
text: approximately half the states would prohibit the successive state prosecution up-
held in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). See Y. KAmisAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 80, at 1512. In a few instances, state courts had held that the successive state
prosecution violated the state constitution. See, e.g., People v. Cooper, 398 Mich. 450,
247 N.W.2d 866 (1976); State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 385 A.2d 844 (1978). But cf. State v.
Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153 (1979); State v. Rogers, 90 N.M. 604, 606, 566 P.2d
1142 (1977) (each noting numerous state cases following Bartkus in the interpretation of
their state double jeopardy provisions). The majority of the states, however, have re-
jected the Bartkus position through statutory, not state constitutional, prohibitions, and
many of these statutes had preceded the Bartkus ruling. See Y. KAmIsAR, W. LAFAvE &
J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 1512 (citing representative statutes). Statutes adopted prior
to Bartkus are listed in MODEL PENAL CODE § 1-11 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1966). At least ten
states not included in that list now have statutory prohibitions that would bar the state
prosecution upheld in Bartkus. Included in that group is Illinois, the state that brought
the prosecution in Bartkus. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-4 (1979).
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196608 and the Jury Selection Act of 1968,109 also are cited as
common models followed by a substantial number of states.
Many lawyers, especially in jurisdictions not following the
model, too often assume that the laws of different states based
on a particular model will be substantially similar in their basic
elements. 1 0 Michigan lawyers, for example, frequently charac-
terize the law in "the Federal Rules states" as if all of these
states simply tracked each Federal Rule. Lawyers from Federal
Rules states, familiar with departures in their own jurisdiction's
rules, are likely to recognize that significant variations exist
among Federal Rules states. Nevertheless, many frequently as-
sume that there is at least substantial similarity as to those
Rules that their own state follows closely.
Determining the degree of similarity in the law of the Federal
Rules states depends initially upon the meaning of "Federal
Rules state." If this reference includes only those states with
court rules largely tracking the language of the Federal Rules,
provision by provision, then it encompasses no more than a half-
dozen states 1 - hardly a sufficient number to contribute sig-
nificantly to uniformity in state law. It is only when the refer-
ence includes states that have simply borrowed substantially
from the Federal Rules that the group includes more than half
of the states.
11 2
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3156 (1976).
109. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1876 (1976 & Supp. IV); see also UNIF. JURY SELECTION AND
SERViCE ACT, 13 U.L.A. 509 (1970) (modeled in large part on the federal act).
110. As with any common source, variations are expected in minor matters of admin-
istration, such as the size of the required master list in a statute modeled after the Jury
Selection Act. It is assumed, however, that states relying on that Act would have adopted
its basic elements, e.g., random selection from a voter registration list, possibly supple-
mented by other lists; limited grounds for disqualification; limited grounds for exemp-
tion; and requirement of extremely prompt challenges to alleged violations.
111. Even under the most liberal construction of "largely tracking" Federal Rules,
this group would include no more than the states of Delaware (Superior Court Criminal
Rules), Idaho, Maine, North Dakota, Ohio, and West Virginia. Moreover, each of these
states deviates in some way from the Federal Rules. Compare DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.
24(e) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 24, IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 8(a) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a), N.
DAK. R. CRiM. P. 7(g) with FED. R. CRIM. P. 7, W. VA. R. CiuM. P. 5.1(a) with Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5.1(a). See also infra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.
112. This category includes the states cited supra note 111 as well as Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. In
addition, in several states with court rules of limited scope, state statutes draw heavily
on the Federal Rules covering the same subjects. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3201 to
-3401 (1981); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-1-101 to -31-202 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-1-1
to -23-12 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
By definition this larger group of states that only "borrow substantially" from the
Federal Rules have departed from the Federal Rules on various matters. Such depar-
tures are hardly surprising because, in many respects, the state and federal criminal jus-
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Within this larger group of Federal Rules states, the basic
standards of the Rules are followed on numerous issues. For ex-
ample, almost every Federal Rules state follows Federal Rule
12(b), requiring that motions to suppress be made before trial, 1 3
rather than at trial through a contemporaneous objection to the
introduction of the evidence.114 As under Federal Rule 12(f), the
states treat the failure to make the motion before trial, absent
good cause, as a basis for forfeiture of the objection. Some divi-
sion may arise concerning the scope of the trial judge's discre-
tion to excuse a failure to object,11 5 but the basic elements of the
tice processes operate in quite different settings. As a result crimes prosecuted in federal
courts often have a somewhat different character than crimes typically treated in the
state systems. Federal prosecutions involve a substantially smaller portion of "street
crimes" and a substantially higher portion of white collar crimes. See M. HINDELANG, M.
GOTrFiREDSON & T. FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 419-20 (1981) (30% of all federal prose-
cutions fall within categories of "embezzlement and fraud" or "forgery and counterfeit-
ing," while only 6.5% fall within the category of "homicide, robbery, assault, and bur-
glary"). In addition, state prosecuting and police agencies tend to be much more
fragmented and less interdependent than their counterpart federal agencies. See H.
KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 407-11, 426-29 (J. Israel 2d ed.
1979). State courts also often have much heavier caseloads. See id. at 198.
113. See ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 12(b); ARIz. R. CaM. P. 16.1; CoLo. R. CRiM. P. 41(e);
DEL. SUPER. CT. P. 41(e); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(h); HAWAII R. CiuM. P. 12(b); IDAHO R.
Cm. P. 12(b); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 10(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3216(3) (1981); ME. R.
CriM. P. 41(e); MD. R. CRiM. P. 736(g); MAsS. R. CraM. P. 13; MINN. R. CaM. P. 8.03;
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-302(2) (1981); N.J. R. CiuM. P. 3:5-7(a); N.D. R. CRIM. P.
12(b); OHIo R. CRIM. P. 12(b); R.I. R. CriM. P. 41(f); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
8(3) (1979); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 12(b); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-12(b) (Supp. 1981); VT. R.
CriM. P. 12(b); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 4.5(h); W. VA. R. CriM. P. 12(b).
114. This latter practice was formerly very common. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531,
589-90 (1956); see also Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965). Today, the only Fed-
eral Rules states following this practice are Kentucky and Virginia. See Ky. R. CRIM. P.
9.78 ("If at any time before trial a defendant moves to suppress, or during trial makes
timely objection to the admission of evidence consisting of (a) a confession or other in-
criminating statements alleged to have been made by him to police authorities or (b) the
fruits of a search, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing. . . ."). Virginia
does not have a separate provision on the timing of the motion to suppress. The general
provision on motions that must be made before trial, however, does not refer to the
suppression motion, see VA. R. CRIM. P. 3A:12(c), and case law establishes that suppres-
sion motions need not be made before trial, Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 176
S.E.2d 309, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1970).
115. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 12(e) (providing that failure to make the motion before
trial "shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
the waiver"). Some states follow this language, leaving the definition of good cause to
judicial development. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRiM. P. 12(e). Other states legislatively define
excuses for failure to make the motion before trial. See, e.g., ARiz. R. CriM. P. 16.1(c)
(the basis for the motion "was not then known, and by exercise of reasonable diligence
could not then have been known, and the party raises it promptly upon learning of it").
Still others follow the original language of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), 327 U.S. 865 (1946)
("the motion shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion
may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."), amended, 406 U.S. 996-97 (1972).
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provisions are alike. This near unanimity as to Federal Rule
12(b) stands in sharp contrast, however, to the position of the
Rules states on those Federal Rules raising more controversial
policy questions. Consider, for example, the Federal Rule 16
provisions on defense discovery.
As originally adopted, Rule 16 provided for very narrow dis-
covery. The trial court had discretion only to order disclosure of
documents and tangible objects "obtained from or belonging to
the defendant or obtained from others by seizure or by process,
upon a showing that the items sought may be material to the
preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable."'"
6
In 1966, after considerable debate, the Rule was completely
overhauled, with substantial liberalization of the breadth of dis-
covery."1 Although the Rule retained the language of discre-
tion1 8 and restrictively protected internal government docu-
ments and witness' statements from discovery,'1 there was
substantial extension in coverage to include other material docu-
ments and tangible objects held by the government,12 0 as well as
prior recorded statements of the defendant and certain scientific
examinations.'
2 '
In 1975, the Rule was again revised to provide broader discov-
ery, though not as broad as the Advisory Committee had recom-
mended. 2 2 The items listed would no longer be disclosed at the
discretion of the court, nor need there be a showing of special
need. 2  All of the 1966 items were carried over, and two items
See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
116. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, 327 U.S. 846 (1945).
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)-(g), 383 U.S. 1097, 1097-99 (1965).
118. See id. 16(a), 383 U.S. at 1097 ("the court may order").
119. See id. 16(c), 383 U.S. at 1099 (prohibiting use of the expanded discovery provi-
sions to gain disclosure of internal documents made by government agents (e.g., use of
police reports), or statements of government witnesses; such statements would, however,
be made available at trial pursuant to the Jencks Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. 3500 (1969 &
Supp. 1982)).
120. Id. 16(b), 383 U.S. at 1098 (allowing all documents and tangible objects within
the "possession, custody, or control of the government," aside from internal documents
and statements of government witnesses, upon a "showing of materiality" and reasona-
bleness of the request).
121: Id. 16(a), 383 U.S. at 1097-98 (including "written or recorded statements or con-
fessions" of the defendant, prior grand jury testimony of the defendant, and reports of
"physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests of experiments"). Moreover, in
contrast to documents and tangible objects, discovery of these items did not require a
showing of possible materiality to defense preparation. Id.
122. See infra note 124.
123. See FED. R. GRM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (C), (D). The language of the Rule was recast
from "the court may order," to "the court shall order" and "the government shall per-
mit." Id. at (A). The requirement of a showing of reasonableness of a request for docu-
ments and tangible items, see supra note 120, was dropped. Id. at (C).
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were added: (1) the substance of any oral statement given by
defendant in response to interrogation, where the government
intended to use the statement at trial; and (2) the prior record
of the defendant as established by government records." ' The
1975 Rule retained, however, the prohibition against requiring
pretrial disclosure of internal memoranda and statements of
government witnesses. 12 5 Overall, the 1975 Amendment fell short
of the breadth of the A.B.A. Standards,"" but it was certainly a
more liberal discovery provision than the 1966 version. 'a2
Not surprisingly, discovery procedures in the Federal Rules
124. Id. at (A), (B). The Advisory Committee also recommended adding the names of
government witnesses. See Advisory Committee Report, 62 F.R.D. 271, 312 (1975). Con-
gress rejected this proposal. See Pub. L. 94-64, § 3(2)-(28), 89 Stat. 374; Pub. L. 94-149, §
5, 89 Stat. 806.
125. See FED. R. Caim. P. 16(2); see also supra note 119.
126. The Advisory Committee for the 1975 Amendments relied upon the then-cur-
rent A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards, STAnSs RELATING TO DiscovERy AND PROCE-
DURE BEFORE TRIAL § 1.2 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Standards],
in supporting its recommendation for liberalizing federal discovery. See Advisory Com-
mittee Report, 62 F.R.D. 271 passim (1975). The A.B.A. Standards were revised in 1978
to provide for open file discovery, but the state rules incorporating the A.B.A. proposals
all rely on the original version rather than the revision; further reference in this Article is
thus to the 1970 version.
The Committee's proposal to disclose witness names, see supra note 124, was a step in
the direction that the Standards advocated, but it still fell short of the A.B.A. proposal.
The Committee was limited by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 3500(a) (1969 & Supp. 1982),
which forbids disclosure of prior recorded statements of government witnesses until
those witnesses testify at trial. The A.B.A. Standards, in contrast, provide for pretrial
disclosure of the names and statements of all persons the government intends to call as
witnesses, along with their prior criminal records. A.B.A. Standards, supra at § 2.1. This
requirement would encompass statements of police officers as well as other witnesses,
and therefore would include some of the internal memoranda (e.g., police reports) specif-
ically exempted under the Federal Rules. When the Advisory Committee found itself
unable to provide for discovery of witnesses' statements, and Congress rejected disclo-
sure of witness names, see supra note 124, the 1975 amendments fell considerably short
of the A.B.A. Standards in this area.
The A.B.A. Standards also give the court discretion to provide for discovery of addi-
tional matter upon a showing of materiality. See A.B.A. Standards, supra at § 2.5. This
provision also allows discovery of items exempted under the Federal Rules provision on
internal memoranda. Where a police officer is not expected to be a witness and the of-
ficer's report does not include statements of witnesses, the report may nevertheless be
discoverable under this A.B.A. provision. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra
note 80, at 1166 n.b.
Unlike the A.B.A. Standards, the Federal Rules also do not provide for disclosure for a
codefendant's statement in a joint trial. See A.B.A. Standards, supra, at § 2.1(a)(ii).
Where those statements are most likely to be used against the defendant - in conspir-
acy cases - discovery may nevertheless be available in the federal courts on the theory
that the codefendant's statement is being treated as defendant's own. See J. MOORE, 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE D 16.05[1] (2d ed. 1981).
127. It was not more liberal, however, than the broad interpretation of the 1966
Amendment adopted by some district courts. See generally 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 253 (1969) (citing cases).
HeinOnline  -- 15 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 488 1981-1982
SPRING 1982] Criminal Procedure
states range throughout the discovery spectrum, once one gets
beyond the original version of the Federal Rules. A few states
have provisions very much like the 1966 version of Rule 16, pro-
viding for discovery of documents, scientific reporA#, and the de-
fendant's own statements, in the discretion of the court.12 0 Three
states have a modified combination of the 1966 and 1975 ver-
sions of the Rules, basically making disclosure of defendant's
statements mandatory and disclosure of other items discretion-
ary.lse Several states have provisions that generally follow the
1975 version of the Federal Rules.130 A few have provisions that
follow the Advisory Committee's 1975 proposal to include disclo-
sure of witness lists.""' A substantial number of states have pro-
visions based on the A.B.A. Standards, with a few arguably pro-
viding for even broader mandatory disclosure.""
Because I have not had the opportunity to review thoroughly
all of the provisions of the various Federal Rule states, I cannot
guarantee that precisely the same degree of state diversity is to
be found as to other Federal Rules. It is safe to say, however,
that a substantial number of departures from the Federal Rules
will undoubtedly be found in most areas of controversy. Federal
Rule 11, for example, authorizes a practice of prosecutorial sen-
tence bargaining (with subsequent judicial approval) that is an
anathema to the judiciary in many jurisdictions.1 33 Federal Rule
128. See N.D. R. CRIM. P. 16; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.24; cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212
(1981) (including a summary of the defendant's oral statements).
129. See IowA R. CRaM. P. 13; MAss. R. CRIM. P. 14; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-16(a)
(Supp. 1981). These provisions also go beyond the 1975 Rules in some respects. The Iowa
provision includes disclosure of a codefendant's statement and the Massachusetts rule
provides for discretionary disclosure of the names of witnesses.
130. See, e.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. CR1M. R. 16; S.D. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1); TENN. R. CRIM.
P. 16; VA. R. CrM. P. 3A:14. The Delaware and Tennessee rules also provide for discov-
ery of a codefendant's statement in a joint trial. See supra note 126.
131. See, e.g., OHIO R. CrM. P. 16; W. VA. R. CaM. P. 16; cf. ME. R. CRM. P. 16
(witness list discretionary).
132. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CRM. P. 16; ARiz. R. Cau. P. 15.1; CoLo. R. CR1M. P. 16;
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220; HAwAnI R. CaiM. P. 16; IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 16; MD. R. CIM. P. 741;
MINN. R. Cau. P. 9.01; N.J. R. CRaM. P. 3.13-3; R.I. R. CRIM. P. 16; VT. R. CrM. P. 16;
WASH. R. CRIM. P. 4.7. While the A.B.A. Standards, supra note 126, require disclosure of
the names and recorded statements of only those persons the government intends to
introduce as witnesses, the Alaska and Florida provisions require disclosure of the names
and statements of all persons known by the prosecutor to have relevant facts. See FLA.
R. CR1M. P. 3.220(a)(1)(i); ALAsKA R. CR1M. P. 16(b)(1)(i)-(ii). On the other hand, several
of the states following the A.B.A. model have broader work-product exceptions and pro-
vide for more extensive reciprocal discovery by the prosecution. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRM.
P. 3.220(b)(4) (reciprocal disclosure); Amz. R. CraM. P. 15.4(b)(1) (work product).
133. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 105 Mich. App. 614, 307 N.W.2d 385 (1981); cf. Y.
KAMisAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 80, at 177 (4th ed. Supp. 1977) (noting
federal judicial opposition to the amendment). See generally H. MILLER, W. McDONALD
& J. CRAMER, PLEA BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES (1978).
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11 also prohibits judicial participation in the plea agreement dis-
cussions, a procedure which would alter the practice in numer-
ous states. 3 4 Federal Rule 5.1 permits a preliminary hearing
bindover to be based entirely on hearsay, though most states,
particularly those prosecuting by information, insist upon more
substantial evidence. 35 On these issues and others, the common
model of the Federal Rules falls far short of providing uniform-
ity among the states.
The foregoing analysis also applies to federal statutory mod-
els. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 presents one of the
most successful statutory models.' A recent survey found that,
as of 1978, more than half of the states had one or more of the
basic features of the Bail Reform Act: a stated preference for
release on personal recognizance; a ten-percent cash alternative
to the bail bond; and a direction to utilize the least restrictive
condition for release, consistent with ensuring defendant's ap-
pearance at trial.13 7  Yet the same survey concluded that
"[plerhaps the most striking feature of the kinds of provisions
included in the guidelines [i.e., legal standards] of the different
states is their heterogeneity. '"I3 Working from the same federal
model, one state adopted a ten-percent alternative that effec-
tively eliminated bail bondsmen,' 3 ' while another failed even to
direct the magistrate to look first to the ten-percent provision to
determine if that procedure could substitute satisfactorily for
the bail bond. 4 0 Likewise, while the Federal Act refers only to
the ultimate goal of reasonably ensuring appearance at trial,"'
several states with provisions otherwise similar to the Federal
Act further recognize the purpose of protecting the community
from dangerous defendants."'
134. See Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 1059, 1060 & n.8 (1976); Cramer, Rossman & McDonald, The Judicial Role in Plea
Bargaining, in W. McDONALD & J. CRAMER, PLEA-BARGAINING 139 (1980); Ryan & Alfini,
Trial Judges' Participation in Plea Bargaining: An Empirical Perspective, 13 L. &
Soc'y 479 (1978-79).
135. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80, at 997-99.
136. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3149 (1976).
137. See J. GOLDKAmp, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED 56-59, Table 4-1 (1979).
138. Id. at 55.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (1979); see also M. KANNENSOHN & D. HOwARD,
BAIL BOND REFORM IN KENTUCKY AND OREGON 12-13, 18 (1978) (noting these states' pro-
visions effectively eliminating bondsmen).
140. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 1201 nn.26-27 (5th Cir. 1977) (explaining
how the Florida Supreme Court adopted bail rules that did not require the use of the
least onerous bail provisions), vacated as moot, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976). The reference here is to noncapital cases and release
pending trial, not to release after conviction. See id. at § 3148.
142. See J. GOLDKAMP, supra note 137, at 61 n.19.
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III. THE COMMON LAW AND UNIFORMITY IN STATE LAW
The "common law" - those standards derived from English
legal tradition or well established in the American legal tradition
before the turn of the century - is occasionally cited as another
common source that produces substantial uniformity in various
aspects of state law. " s Many aspects of Michigan criminal pro-
cedure are governed by common law rules, and in the course of
researching a proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, I had occasion to review the treatment of those
common law rules in various other states. In every instance in
which our Committee members suggested we possibly modify or
abandon the common law rule, I found at least several other
states had already taken that step.
One of the more controversial common law rules that we re-
viewed was that limiting police arrest authority for misdemean-
ors. Under the traditional rule, an officer could make a warrant-
less arrest for a misdemeanor only if the misdemeanor was
committed in the officer's presence. 14 4 A then-recent Michigan
case suggested possible acceptance of mere probable cause to be-
lieve that a misdemeanor was being committed in the officer's
presence.'" Critics of the common law rule urged that we go be-
yond this new standard and reject any form of the "in-presence"
requirement; it should be sufficient, they argued, to have the
same probable cause needed for felony arrests. Supporters of the
common law rule felt that any lower threshold for misdemeanor
arrests was an improper innovation." 6 A review of the law of
other states, aided by a recent ALI survey, 47 revealed that some
143. Cf. H. KEEPER, supra note 112, at 27-28.
144. The original English rule and the early American rule limited the arrest author-
ity of any person to misdemeanors involving a breach of the peace and committed in the
presence of the person making the arrest. See Bohlen & Shulman, Arrest With and
Without a Warrant, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 490-91 (1927); Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 673, 701-09 (1924). For police officers, however, American law
soon extended authorization for warrantless arrests to any misdemeanor committed in
the officer's presence. See A.L.I. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 231 (1931) (citing various
statutes and judicial decisions). As a result, the common law rule is often described to-
day without reference to the early breach-of-the-peace limitation. See, e.g., United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976).
145. See People v. Dixon, 45 Mich. App. 64, aff'd, 392 Mich. 691 (1973).
146. See SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE REVISION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE
BAR OF MICHIGAN, PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE MICHIGAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PROPOSED CHAPTERS Two-FIvE 144-50 (1976) (discussing the holdings in various
jurisdictions).
147. A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 692-95 (Proposed Official
Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE]. This survey is rather
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states followed the position of the supporters, others followed
the position of the critics, and many others adopted positions
that fell between the two.
Among the jurisdictions following the common law rule, sev-
eral required actual commission of the misdemeanor in the of-
ficer's presence, "1 8 while others required only probable cause to
believe that a misdemeanor was being committed in the officer's
presence. """ Several states retained the "in-presence" require-
ment for some misdemeanors, but permitted arrests upon proba-
ble cause alone for other misdemeanors.1 50 Other states elimi-
nated the "in-presence" requirement for all misdemeanors when
the officer had reason to believe that an immediate arrest was
necessary to ensure the person's apprehension or to prevent
physical injury or property damage.151 Finally, several states had
discarded completely the "in-presence" requirement, treating
misdemeanor arrests in the same manner as felony arrests. Al-
though some of these jurisdictions had only recently come to
that position,1 52 others had rejected the common law require-
ment prior to the turn of the century."
Although the misdemeanor arrest rule was one of the few com-
mon law standards retained in Michigan that had been modified
or abandoned by a majority of the states, we found numerous
other common law standards from which a substantial group of
states had departed. At common law, no limits were placed on
the type of evidence that could be considered by the grand jury
dated. In particular, many states generally following the common law rule have elimi-
nated the "in-presence" requirement for warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases.
N.C.C. & D., Criminal Justice Newsletter, May 8, 1980; see, e.g., MICH. CoUP. LAWS §
764.15a (1979).
148. See MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 147, at 692 (citing various stat-
utes requiring that the crime be "committed" in the officer's presence). Notwithstanding
statutory language, decisions indicated that several of these states might find acceptable
the standard of probable cause to believe the offense was being committed in the officer's
presence. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 22, § 5.1, at 237.
149. See MODEL PRE-ARRAIGNMENT CODE, supra note 147, at 692.
150. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 594(B); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Page
1982); ORE. REv. STAT. § 133.310(1) (1981); WASH. REv. CODE § 10.31.100 (1980 & Supp.
1982).
151. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (1981); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-404.02 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-401(b)(2) (1978 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-2 (Supp.
1981).
152. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-3-102(c) (1978 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 140.10(1)(b) (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. § 968.07(1)(d) (1971 &
Supp. 1981).
153. See, e.g., HAWAII REv. STAT. § 803-5 (1976 & Supp. 1980) (recodifying P.C. 1869,
C. 49 § 5); ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c) (1980 & Supp. 1982) (codifying R.S. 1874,
div. 6, §§ 4, 5, 8); IOWA CODE § 804.7 (1979 & Supp. 1982) (recodifying 1873 Code, §§
4199, 4200).
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in issuing an indictment. " Nevertheless, a substantial group of
states now bar grand jury use of certain types of evidence that
would be inadmissible at trial.185 The common law also placed
no limits on the prosecutor's authority to refile a charge after it
had been dismissed for insufficient evidence at a preliminary
hearing."s6 Today, however, several states prohibit refiling with-
out the support of additional evidence.5 7 A similar development
has occurred in the grand jury process, as several states now re-
quire court approval for resubmission to the grand jury following
a refusal to indict. 58 In these areas and others, the common law
commands the adherence of a large number of states, but falls
short of providing general uniformity. The common law - like
the Federal Rules model and federal constitutional standards -
produces substantial similarity in some aspects of state law, but
has not precluded development of important alternative ap-
proaches in other areas.
CONCLUSION
Failure to recognize the full range of state law diversity is
hardly the worst of the errors commonly made in analyzing the
criminal justice process," 9 yet it carries with it certain signifi-
cant costs. Initially, this falling may result in a skewed criticism
of the governing law. This is especially true in the area of police
practices, where criticisms tend to be focused almost entirely on
constitutional standards. By failing to recognize the numerous
state standards that exceed the constitutional minimum, civil
libertarians often depict the law as providing far less protection
for the individual than presently exists.16 0 The criticism from
154. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
155. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 80, at 1048-50.
156. See United States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S. 390 (1925); State v. Fahey, 275
N.W.2d 870 (S.D. 1979).
157. See, e.g., People v. George, 114 Mich. App. 204, 318 N.W.2d 666 (1982); Jones v.
State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Wittke v. State ex rel. Smith, 80 Wis. 2d
332, 259 N.W.2d 515 (1977); cf. McNair v. Sheriff, Clark County, Nevada, 89 Nev. 434,
514 P.2d 1175 (1973) (good cause necessary).
158. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 80, at 1027.
159. It is probably not in the same class, for example, as the failure to appreciate
administrative realities, or the failure to appreciate the integrated nature of the process.
See generally R. NIMmER, THu NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACr IN THE CRIM-
INAL COURTS (1978); H. KERPER, supra note 112, at 192-94; Allen, Central Problems of
American Criminal Justice, 75 MICH. L. Rzv. 813, 819-20 (1977).
160. Moreover, when these critics do consider the possible impact of state law, they
tend to narrowly confine their analysis to state standards that deal with precisely the
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the other side, by those concerned with achieving greater crime
control, too often also ignores the entire picture. These critics
commonly direct one complaint after another at Supreme Court
rulings that supposedly "handcuff" the police, while largely ig-
noring state legislative standards denying the police important
investigative authority otherwise acceptable under Supreme
Court precedent.1 1
A lack of appreciation of the diversity in state law is also
likely to affect adversely the progress of law reform. Lawyers
seeking to overturn a well-established local rule too often look to
the law of other jurisdictions with the expectation that little
help is likely to be found there. If they fail to come across a
judicial ruling that is directly on point, their research ends; sys-
tematic review of statutes and court rules, or of judicial deci-
sions dealing with related aspects of the same procedure, will
not be attempted. As a result, courts and legislatures do not
have before them the full range of the experience of other juris-
dictions. There have undoubtedly been many instances in which
rejected reforms would have been adopted, or adopted reforms
modified, if such information had been available. 1 '
same issue as the Supreme Court ruling, ignoring other aspects of state law that might
also limit police authority. Consider the criticism that followed United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), which upheld a
full search of the person following a "custodial arrest" for a traffic offense. Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 244-47, cited a variety of state decisions taking a
contrary position, so civil libertarian critics generally conceded that those states might
continue to bar full searches under their state constitutions. See, eg., People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975). Critics complained
that application of the Robinson-Gustafson standard in the remaining states would leave
the police there almost unlimited discretion in determining whether to search. Once a
traffic stop was made, the argument went, the officer could choose between either issuing
a citation, or making the full custodial arrest with its accompanying full search. Cf. Am-
sterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rzv. 349, 416 (1974).
This was the situation that apparently existed in Gustafson, where the state of Florida
did not limit the traffic offenses for which a custodial arrest could be made. In many
states, however, custodial arrests are permitted for only a limited class of traffic offenses,
such as driving without a license. For the vast majority of traffic offenses, the officer
must release the licensed driver on a citation, and Robinson-Gusta(son does not apply.
See Y. KAMnSAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISPuiL, supra note 80, at 402 na; see also Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 451 n.12 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. For instance, the Michigan legislature opposes broad electronic eavesdropping
practices. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Other states continue to impose the
"in-presence" requirement for misdemeanor arrests. See supra notes 148 & 150 and ac-
companying text. In the last few years, the "new federalism" movement has captured the
attention of the crime-control critics and directed more of their efforts at state law. Cali-
fornia's recently adopted "Victim's Bill of Rights" was apparently aimed, in part, at Cal-
ifornia state court decisions that exceeded federal constitutional minimums in the area
of search and seizure. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(d).
162. Even where an effort is made to thoroughly review statutes, court rules, and
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Part of the responsibility for the lack of practioner apprecia-
tion of the variation in state law lies with the law schools. Many
criminal procedure courses are actually courses in constitutional
criminal procedure, with the course materials focusing almost
entirely on the United States Supreme Court's constitutional
rulings.1 Other courses do no more than add coverage of the
Federal Rules and lower federal court rulings. 1 4 There are
sound pedagogical reasons for both constitutional procedure
courses and constitutional/Federal Rules courses. For those in-
terested primarily in teaching legal method, the constitutional
procedure course has the advantage of focusing on the develop-
ment of a single source by a single court.165 For those interested
primarily in presenting the process as an interrelated system,
there is an advantage in focusing on a single jurisdiction. The
federal system is selected both because it contributes a "national
outlook" to the course and because the Federal Rules are viewed
as a "typical" set of standards.
My colleagues and I have long taken the position, however,
that a course in criminal procedure should be more comprehen-
sive. It should also expose the student to the diversity of state
rules dealing with the various aspects of the criminal process.166
To appreciate what the process had done and can do, the stu-
dent must see more than the federal system and the constitu-
decisions of the various jurisdictions, the failure to appreciate the full range of diversity
in state law may unduly restrict the scope of that inquiry. The criminal justice process is
integrated, each part bearing on the other. A procedural reform may work well in one
jurisdiction in large part because of the way it meshes with other procedures in that
jurisdiction. When another state considers transplanting that reform, it must consider
the differences not only in the particular procedure to be reformed, but also in the state's
treatment of those related procedures. Differences in related procedures could be ig-
nored, however, if one too readily assumes basic similarity in state procedures. I recall
such an instance in a discussion of a proposal that Michigan substantially restrict its
preliminary hearing. A proponent of that proposal noted that Florida no longer required
any form of preliminary hearing. See FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.140(g). He knew that Florida,
like Michigan, relied largely on prosecution by information, rather than by indictment,
and assumed that the Florida experience therefore was analogous. What he failed to
recognize was that Florida, unlike Michigan (and most other states), had an extensive
discovery deposition procedure. See id. at 3.220(d); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
supra note 80, at 1168-70. One of the major defense uses of the preliminary hearing in
Michigan is as a makeshift procedure for deposing prosecution witnesses. See id. at 966-
72.
163. See, e.g., J. SCARBORO & J. WHITE, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES,
QUESTIONS AN NOTES (1977).
164. See, e.g., L WaINREB, CRIMINAL PROCESS: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS (1978).
165. For many, the course in constitutional criminal procedure is more an extension
of the basic course on constitutional law than a course in criminal procedure.
166. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 80 (5th ed. 1980, 4th ed.
1974, 3d ed. 1969).
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tional aspects of criminal procedure. The addition of state mate-
rial necessarily adds to the size of the course book, but there are
points at which a little less detail on the federal position could
be readily sacrificed for the exploration of somewhat divergent
state positions. In recent years, some of the new course books
entering the field have taken a similar position.167 If this trend
continues, more students should recognize the potential for state
law variation, and be alert for it in their everyday practice and
their service on committees and commissions engaged in law
reform.
167. See, e.g., F. MnIZRE, &. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CIMNAL JUSTIcE ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1982); S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PRO-
cFDwUR: CASES AND COMMENTARY (1980).
[VOL. 15:3
HeinOnline  -- 15 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 496 1981-1982
